

## Message Text

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ORIGIN NEA-12

INFO OCT-01 AF-10 EUR-25 IO-13 ADP-00 PRS-01 PCH-04 PA-03

USIA-12 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-02 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-10 RSC-01 SS-15 MC-02 OMB-01 ACDA-19 EB-11

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E. O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PFOR

SUBJECT: DEPARTMENT PRESS BRIEFING

FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE FOLLOWING IS PARTIAL EXCERPT FROM DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN'S PRESS BRIEFING MAY 31, 1973:

QUOTE: MR. HARE: THERE HAVE BEEN SOME QUESTIONS THAT HAVE BEEN ASKED IN THE COURSE OF THIS MORNING ON ARMS TO THE PERSIAN GULF. I THOUGHT I WOULD TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO OUTLINE SOME OF THE CONSIDERATIONS BEFORE US, PARTICULARLY TO REVIEW THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF OUR POLICY TOWARDS SECURITY IN THE GULF WHICH WAS PRESENTED IN CONSIDERABLE DETAIL BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO LAST AUGUST BEFORE THE HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE NEAR EAST.

I UNDERSTAND THAT THE SUBCOMMITTEE PUBLISHED A REPORT AT THAT TIME ENTITLED " U. S. INTERESTS AND POLICY TOWARDS THE PERSIAN GULF."

BASICALLY, IT BECAME CLEAR TO US THAT THE COUNTRIES IN THE AREA WOULD HAVE TO TAKE ON NEW SECURITY RESPONSIBILITIES WHEN BRITAIN ANNOUNCED IN 1968 ITS INTENTION TO TERMINATE ITS PROTECTIVE ROLE IN THE GULF.

OUR POLICY HAS BEEN TO SEEK TO ENCOURAGE IRAN, SAUDI ARABIA, KUWAIT, AND THE SMALLER STATES IN THE GULF TO COOPERATE WITH ONE ANOTHER TO ASSURE THAT THIS REGION REMAINS SECURE.

AND IT'S NATURAL THAT THEY HAVE INCREASINGLY TURNED TO THE UNITED STATES TO PURCHASE MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND SERVICES AS THEY SEEK TO BUILD UP THEIR DEFENSE CAPABILITIES. THUS, OUR SALE OF ARMS AND SERVICES IS NOT A SUDDEN REACTION TO  
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NEW SECURITY CONCERNS OR TO THE ENERGY PROBLEM BUT RATHER A CONTINUING RESPONSE GOING BACK A NUMBER OF YEARS TO THE LEGITIMATE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS OF FRIENDLY STATES IN THE GULF.

WHILE I CAN'T GO INTO ALL OF THE DETAILS, THE FIGURES WHICH WE HAVE SEEN RECENTLY IN THE PRESS APPEAR TO REFLECT CUMULATIVE TOTALS OF EQUIPMENT SOLD IN THE PAST AS WELL AS FUTURE DELIVERIES AND SALES ARRANGEMENTS CURRENTLY UNDER DISCUSSION.

Q. ARE YOU IN A POSITION TO BE MORE SPECIFIC ABOUT THESE FIGURES, BECAUSE THE SENTENCE YOU HAVE JUST READ IS

RATHER VAGUE.

A. I SAID THEY APPEAR TO REFLECT CUMULATIVE TOTALS OF EQUIPMENT.

Q. HOW FAR BACK IN THE PAST, AND WHAT PERIOD OF THE FUTURE? WHAT ARE YOU TALKING ABOUT?

A. WELL, I'M OBVIOUSLY TALKING ABOUT, ONE, CURRENT DISCUSSIONS RELATING TO SALES AT THE PRESENT TIME, PLUS PAST DELIVERIES OVER THE LAST TWO OR THREE YEARS TO COUNTRIES IN THE AREA, AS A GENERAL TIME FRAMEWORK, GOING BACK BASICALLY, AS I SAID, TO THE 1968 DECISION OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT.

Q. FORGIVE MY IGNORANCE, I WASN'T HERE THIS MORNING. WHY DO YOU MAKE THIS STATEMENT?

A. WELL, THERE HAVE BEEN A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS HERE IN RECENT DAYS ABOUT THE QUESTION OF OUR ARMS RELATIONSHIPS TO THE STATES IN THE PERSIAN GULF AREA.

I HAVE ALSO NOTED THE STATEMENTS OF FOREIGN MINISTER EBAN. WE HAVE NOT SEEN THE TEXT OF HIS REMARKS AND, CONSEQUENTLY, I DON'T HAVE ANY SPECIFIC COMMENT AT THIS TIME. AS A GENERAL MATTER, HOWEVER, WE ARE AWARE OF THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT'S CONCERN ABOUT POSSIBLE U. S. ARMS SALES TO COUNTRIES IN THE PERSIAN GULF AND WILL CONTINUE TO GIVE THESE VIEWS UNCLASSIFIED

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FULL CONSIDERATION.

I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT ANY DECISIONS WE HAVE MADE OR MAKE IN THE FUTURE TAKE FULLY INTO ACCOUNT OUR LONG-STANDING POLICY OF SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL'S LEGITIMATE SECURITY CONCERNS. WE OBVIOUSLY WOULD NOT MAKE SALES WHICH WE FELT WOULD PLACE ISRAEL'S SECURITY IN JEOPARDY.

I WOULD ALSO POINT OUT THAT ANY ARMS SALES THE U. S. MAY MAKE ARE RELATED TO SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS IN THE GULF, WHICH ARE NOTED EARLIER. AND, MOREOVER, I WOULD NOTE THAT ANY MILITARY EQUIPMENT SOLD BY THE UNITED STATES TO A RECIPIENT COUNTRY IS NOT ALLOWED TO BE TRANSFERRED TO ANY THIRD PARTY WITHOUT U. S. PERMISSION.

Q. CAN YOU GIVE US THIS CUMULATIVE FIGURE ON PERHAPS SAUDI ARABIA AND KUWAIT THAT YOU ARE TALKING ABOUT, WHICH SEEM TO BE THE MAIN RECIPIENTS?

A. NO, I DON'T THINK I CAN GIVE YOU A CUMULATIVE FIGURE, IN LARGE PART BECAUSE WE ARE IN FACT HAVING DISCUSSIONS, FOR EXAMPLE, WITH THE KUWAITEES AT THE PRESENT TIME.

Q. WHEN YOU SAY WE TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION ISRAEL'S LEGITIMATE CONCERN FOR ITS OWN SECURITY IN SELLING THESE WEAPONS AND THAT THEY CAN'T BE TRANSFERRED TO THIRD PARTIES, IS THERE ANYTHING TO PROTECT ISRAEL OR TO PROHIBIT, FOR INSTANCE, SAUDI ARABIA FROM TAKING THE FIFTY FRENCH MIRAGES THAT APPARENTLY IT IS TRYING TO BUY NOW AND TRANSFERRING THEM TO A THIRD COUNTRY AND THEN REPLACING THOSE FIFTY WITH AMERICAN EQUIPMENT, THEREFORE ACCOMPLISHING BOTH PURPOSES AND OBTAINING OUR REGULATIONS?

A. I'M NOT FAMILIAR WITH WHATEVER OTHER ARMS TRANSACTIONS WHICH SAUDI ARABIA MAY OR MAY NOT BE ENTERING INTO. HOWEVER, AS A GENERAL PROPOSITION, AND AS I THOUGHT I MADE CLEAR EARLIER, WE WOULD OBVIOUSLY NOT ENTER INTO ANY PROGRAM OF SALES WHICH WOULD PLACE ISRAEL'S SECURITY IN JEOPARDY.

Q. CAN YOU TURN THAT AROUND, AND CAN YOU TELL ME IF WE UNCLASSIFIED

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HAVE EXTRACTED A PROMISE FROM THESE STATES THAT THIS EQUIPMENT WILL NOT BE TURNED OVER TO A THIRD PARTY? WE CAN SET A RULE, BUT IT DOESN'T MEAN THAT EVERYBODY HAS TO PLAY BY OUR RULES. HAVE WE GOT A PROMISE OR A PLEDGE?

A. NORMALLY WHEN SOME SORT OF SALES AGREEMENT IS ACCOMPLISHED THIS WOULD SPECIFICALLY BE WRITTEN INTO THE CONTRACT.

Q. THE PREMISE OF YOUR STATEMENT IS THAT THERE APPEARS TO BE SOME THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF THE STATES IN THE

PERSIAN GULF BECAUSE THESE SALES ARE BASED ON THE IDEA THAT YOU HAVE TO MAKE THESE AREAS OR COUNTRIES SECURE. WHERE IS THIS THREAT COMING FROM?

A. I DON'T WISH TO GET MYSELF INTO A THREAT ANALYSIS AT THE PRESENT TIME; NOR DO I WISH TO OUTLINE FOR YOU WHAT SAUDI ARABIA OR IRAN OR KUWAIT OR THE OTHER GULF STATES MAY SPECIFICALLY CONSIDER TO BE THEIR LEGITIMATE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS AND INTERESTS. I DON'T THINK IT'S INCUMBENT UPON ME TO OUTLINE FOR YOU SPECIFICALLY WHAT THEIR PERCEPTION IS.

Q. WELL, I MEAN, FOR EXAMPLE, YOU WOULD NOT, FOR EXAMPLE, BE SUPPLYING PLANES, AIRCRAFT, TANKS FOR INTERNAL SECURITY, BUT YOU MIGHT IF THERE WAS SOME EXTERNAL THREAT. SURELY YOU CAN GIVE US SOME GUIDANCE AT LEAST AS FAR AS THAT IS CONCERNED.

A. WELL, FOR EXAMPLE, AT THE PRESENT TIME, IN OUR DIS-

CUSSIONS WITH SAUDI ARABIA, WE HAVE INDICATED A WILLINGNESS IN PRINCIPLE TO SELL TO THE SAUDI ARABIAN GOVERNMENT A LIMITED NUMBER OF F-4 AIRCRAFT. BROADLY DEFINED, I WOULD CONSIDER THIS TYPE OF WEAPON SYSTEM DESIGNED FOR EXTERNAL SECURITY RATHER THAN INTERNAL SECURITY.

Q. DO WE CONSIDER THE POWER STRUCTURE THERE TO BE OVER-BALANCED AT PRESENT IN FAVOR OF ISRAEL AS AGAINST THE ARAB STATES, AND IS THIS AN ATTEMPT TO REDRESS THE BALANCE?

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A. NO, THAT IS NOT THE THRUST OF WHAT I HAVE BEEN SAYING.

I HAVE BEEN TRYING TO PUT THE EMPHASIS MUCH MORE IN TERMS OF WHAT MAY BE REQUIRED WITHIN THE PERSIAN GULF CONTEXT.

Q. YES, YOU SPOKE OF THE GULF. ALSO THE WORD " OIL " CREPT IN HERE AND CREPT OUT VERY QUICKLY. I WONDER IF YOU COULD ELABORATE A LITTLE BIT ON WHAT I THINK YOU SAID ABOUT OIL HAVING NOTHING TO DO WITH THIS DECISION AT ALL. COULD YOU PUT OIL IN ONE SEPARATE SENTENCE ALL BY ITSELF, INSTEAD OF AS A KIND OF A CLAUSE, AS A THROWAWAY LINE IN A LONGER SENTENCE?

A. I SAID EARLIER, IN A PREVIOUS BRIEFING HERE, THAT WE CONSIDERED -- WE BELIEVE THAT WE HAVE IMPORTANT NATIONAL INTERESTS IN THE PERSIAN GULF. AND AT THAT TIME A QUESTION WAS ASKED, DOES THAT INCLUDE OIL, AND I SAID OBVIOUSLY YES, IT DOES INCLUDE OIL.

Q. ALL RIGHT. NOW, ARE OUR SALES TO THESE COUNTRIES RELATED TO ASSURING OUR OIL SUPPLY OR OUR OIL INTERESTS IN THE GULF? IS THERE A CONNECTION BETWEEN OUR --

A. THEY ARE NOT UNRELATED, OBVIOUSLY.

Q. BUT ARE THEY RELATED?

A. IN ANY CASE LIKE THIS, WE ARE TALKING ABOUT A GENERAL POLICY, A GENERAL APPROACH TO AN AREA WHICH IS A COMBINATION OF -- WHICH INCLUDES A COMBINATION OF DIFFERENT INTERESTS. I AM NOT GOING TO TRY AND RELATE ARMS DELIVERIES SPECIFICALLY TO THE QUESTION OF OIL. I WOULD, AS I HAVE INDICATED AND EMPHASIZED BEFORE -- I WOULD PUT THE EMPHASIS PRIMARILY ON STABILITY IN THE PERSIAN GULF AREA, FLOWING FROM ESSENTIALLY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT DECISION OF 1968.

Q. YOU HAVE SAID ON A COUPLE OF OCCASIONS THAT YOU DON' T WANT TO LEAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT WE ARE JUMPING INTO THIS AREA OR THAT ARMS SALES -- HAVE ARMS SALES BEEN INCREASED

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IN THE RECENT SIX MONTHS, WITHOUT GETTING INTO THE FIGURES, WHICH APPARENTLY YOU ARE NOT PREPARED TO GIVE US NOW. WOULD THE RECORD SHOW THAT THERE HAS BEEN AN INCREASE IN US. ARMS SALES OVER THE PAST SIX MONTHS?

A. AS A FACTUAL MATTER, I AM NOT SURE. IN MANY INSTANCES HERE, WE ARE TALKING ABOUT ONGOING DISCUSSIONS. SO IT IS RATHER DIFFICULT TO ANSWER YOUR QUESTION SPECIFICALLY.

Q. WELL, PERHAPS I AM NOT MAKING MY QUESTION VERY CLEAR, BECAUSE I AM CERTAINLY NOT GETTING AN ANSWER TO IT. I DON'T QUESTION THE FACT THAT ARMS SALES HAVE BEEN GOING ON FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS. I WOULD JUST LIKE TO KNOW WHETHER THOSE ARMS SALES HAVE BEEN INCREASED SUBSTANTIALLY OVER THE LAST SIX MONTHS.

A. I WILL TAKE THE QUESTION.

Q. WHILE YOU ARE TAKING THAT QUESTION, COULD I GO BACK AND ASK AGAIN IF YOU COULD GET FOR US THE FIGURES, THE EXACT FIGURES, OR AS CLOSE TO THEM AS YOU CAN OF THE ARMS SALES PROGRAMS TO THE GULF STATES TO DATE -- WHAT WE HAVE SOLD, AND BREAK THEM DOWN INTO WHAT EQUIPMENT IS AVAILABLE. I KNOW YOU HAVE PROBLEMS WITH CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS. BUT WE OUGHT TO BE ABLE TO HAVE FIGURES AVAILABLE ON EXACTLY WHAT WE HAVE SOLD TO THESE COUNTRIES.

A. YES.

Q. ALSO, BACK TO THE QUESTION, WHICH YOU NEVER ANSWERED-- CAN YOU GET FOR US, IF YOU ARE NOT WILLING TO NOW, SOME KIND OF EXPOSITION ON WHAT OUR SECURITY INTERESTS ARE THERE, WHY WE FEEL THAT THERE IS SOME THREAT TO THE STABILITY AND SECURITY OF THE AREA?

A. YES, I CERTAINLY WILL. I HAVE NOT IN FACT PERUSED SUFFICIENTLY ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO'S STATEMENT, WHICH I REFERRED TO EARLIER. BUT I BELIEVE THAT MIGHT SATISFY YOUR REQUEST.

Q. JUST ON THAT POINT. YOU MENTIONED SISCO, AND I WAS  
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GOING TO ASK YOU. LET'S PUT IT THIS WAY. IF WE HELD SISCO'S STATEMENT UP AGAINST EVERYTHING THAT YOU SAID HERE TODAY, WOULD WE HAVE A PERFECT MATCH? OR TO PUT IT A DIFFERENT WAY -- HAS OUR POLICY CHANGED SINCE SISCO MADE THAT STATEMENT IN AUGUST? ARE WE MORE CONCERNED ABOUT THE

GULF, ARE WE MORE INFLUENCED BY OUR NEED FOR OIL? IS ISRAEL TOO STRONG TO SUIT OUR PURPOSES TODAY? WHAT HAS HAPPENED?

A. NO -- I THINK OUR APPRECIATION OF THE SITUATION WOULD STILL HOLD.

Q. THINGS HAVEN' T CHANGED. IF WE READ SISCO' S STATEMENT--

A. THINGS ALWAYS CHANGE.

Q. IF WE READ SISCO' S STATEMENT AS A POLICY STATEMENT, WE COULD BE CONFIDENT THAT IT IS OUR POLICY TODAY. OUR POLICY HASN' T CHANGED SINCE SISCO CAME UP TO THE HOUSE, RIGHT?

A. OUR ESSENTIAL POLICIES HAVE NOT CHANGED SINCE THAT TIME, NO.

Q. IS YOUR STATEMENT TODAY IN ANY WAY RELATED TO AN ISRAELI COMPLAINT ABOUT THE ONGOING U. S. NEGOTIATION FOR ARMS TO SAUDI ARABIA? YOU REFERRED TO ABBA EBAN' S SPEECH.

A. YES.

Q. I AM ASKING BEYOND THAT -- WHETHER THERE WAS A SPECIFIC AND MOST RECENT ISRAELI COMPLAINT TO THIS GOVERNMENT ON THIS PARTICULAR NEGOTIATION.

A. I AM NOT AWARE OF ANY SPECIFIC COMPLAINT. AS I INDICATED EARLIER, WE ARE AWARE OF SOME OF ISRAEL' S CONCERNS.

Q. WHICH HAVE BEEN PASSED ON HOW?

A. THROUGH NORMAL DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS.

Q. BUT YOU ARE QUARRELING WITH THE WORD " COMPLAINT"?  
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IS THAT THE PROBLEM?

A. I WOULDN' T CHARACTERIZE IT NECESSARILY AS A COMPLAINT, NO.

Q. HOW WOULD YOU DO IT -- IF THEY EXPRESS THEIR CONCERNS ABOUT AN ARMS SALE TO AN ARAB COUNTRY?

A. I WOULD CHARACTERIZE IT AS AN INDICATION OF ISRAELI CONCERN.

Q. BUT IN ADDITION TO THE ABBA EBAN SPEECH, WAS THERE ANYTHING IN A DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGE WITH ISRAEL ON THAT?

A. WE HAVE, OF COURSE, DISCUSSED THIS MATTER WITH THE ISRAELIS. THAT IS WHAT I AM INDICATING -- YES.

Q. AND ARE THOSE THE PARAMETERS OF HIS CONCERN -- JUST THE ARMS SALE -- OR IS THERE A CONCERN ABOUT OUR POLICY, POSSIBLY REFLECTED IN THE ARMS SALES?

A. WELL, I AM NOT GOING TO SPEAK ANY MORE ABOUT WHAT THE ISRAELI PERCEPTION IS THAN I HAVE SO FAR.

Q. YOU SAID THERE HAD BEEN NO CHANGE IN THE U. S. POLICY SINCE SISCO'S SPEECH. BUT AMBASSADOR SCALI AT THE WHITE HOUSE ON TUESDAY SAID THERE HAD BEEN.

A. HE SAID THERE HAD BEEN A CHANGE? WELL, I READ HIS REMARKS, AND I DIDN' T SEE THAT CONTAINED IN HIS REMARKS. IF YOU WANT TO ELABORATE, I WILL TRY TO ANSWER YOUR QUESTION. END QUOTE. RUSH

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